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ABSTRACT
Onthe basis of a comparative growth analysis of ten major industrial
countries, it is shown thattheproductivity slowdown of the l970s can be
attributed to a combination of the energy and raw material price shocks and
the contractionary macroeconomic policies that were followed in response
to these shocks. For a raw material intensive sector the rise in the relative
price of material inputs has lowered gross output per unit of the other
complementary factors, labour and capital. For the aggregated manufacturing
sector of the ten economies this explains on average about 60% of the
productivity slowdown. A more disaggregated analysis for U.K. manufacturing
industries is also given.
On the demand side, terms of trade deterioration hasreducedreal
income and consumption and the profit squeeze has lowered investment demand.
Fear of inflation and current account deficits has imparted a further
deflationary bias to aggregate demand management in most industrial countries.
Depressed demand and greater output variability have hampered factor
reallocation in response to the exogenous shocks.
The overriding role of demand contraction, particularly in the non—
manufacturing industries, is shown in a comparative analysis of the aggregate
business sector and a partial view of labour productivity growth in the
service industries of these economies.
The industrial countries can be contrasted with the middle income
developing countries where output and productivity continued to grow more
evenly after 1973, at the cost of large current account deficits and higher
persistent inflation. This provides further evidence that productivity
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INTRODUCTION
The output and productivity slowdown of the l970s seems a unique phenomenon
when viewed against the background of the whole of the post-Second World
War period. It has been widespread and has affected virtually all
industrial countries. It also seems to have been fairly widespread
sectorally, although this aspect has not yet been adequately investigated.
Conventional growth accounting procedures (e.g., Denison, 1979,
Kendrick, 1981) decompose the slowdown in terms of quantity, quality, and
utilization of labour and capital inputs, research and development effort,
environmental regulations, etc. While these yield some partial explanations
and may narrow down the extent of the puzzle, they leave one unsatisfied
because there is a dominant characteristic of the slowdown that eludes
such explanation. With a few exceptions the beginning of the phenomenon
can be dated at about 1973, when a major break occurs in the slope of the
*Thisstudy was carried out at the National Bureau of Economic Research
(Cambridge, Mass.), and at the Falk Institute (Jerusalem); it was
supported financially by a grant of the National Science Foundation.
None of these institutions bear any responsibility for its contents.
I ant indebted to Louis Dicks-Mireaux for help in the analysis of U.K.
data collected by him, to Carlos Bachrach, student at the Hebrew
University, for part of the computations, and to Susanne Freund for
editorial assistance. I also wish to thank Jeffrey Sachs, my collaborator
in earlier work, for helpful discussion of some preliminary ideas.+ —2-
various time series. For a growth-accounting approach this is a rather
disturbing feature. Changes in the research and development effort,
conventional input qualities, and environmental regulations are gradual
processes. They can hardly explain sharp turning points, let alone the
close synchronization of developments across countries. On the other hand,
the very existence of such a watershed.may provide a helpful lead for
economic research. Rather than trying to chisel away the phenomenon into
little boxes, one can start the analysis at the other end, so to say. One
may concentrate on the turning point itself, try to characterize the
response to the worldwide shocks of the 1970s, and then ask to what extent
the events themselves could help to explain the apparent productivity
slowdown. Such an approach may still leave some open questions but it has
the advantage of a search for common causes as well as enabling one to
gain insight from the differences in response among countries or sectors.
The first and obvious candidate for analysis is the sharp increase
in the price of energy. This in itself may not explain much, but when
viewed in the context of the general increase in the price of industrial
raw materials that occurred in the l970s, does provide a lead. For a raw-
material intensive activity the conventional two-factor view of the production
process is only valid when the relative price of the raw material (in
output units) or its unit input stays constant. When its relative price
rises and it is a complementary factor of production, productivity per
unit of the other factors, labour and capital, must fall. Profits must
also fall, the extent of the fall depending on the extent of real wage
rigidity. The profit squeeze will cause an investment slowdown which in
turn affects the accumulation of capital thereby causing a further slowdown
in labour productivity. As we shall see, the supply shifts of 1973-74 and+ -3- +
1979-80go quite a long way towards explaining the slowdown in the
manufacturing sector of some major industrial countries and also account
for international differences. The direct link between theraw-material
price shock and the productivity slowdown in manufacturing (first analysed
in Bruno, 1981) is further explored for a cross section often OECD
countries, in Section I, which also contains a more disaggregated study
of U.K. manufacturing industries.
Raw materials alone do not give a complete answer formanufacturing,
let alone for nonmanufacturing industries. As is wellknown, the oil and
raw-material price shocks have not only shiftedaggregate supply for most
industrial countries, they have also set in motioncontractionary forces
on the demand side. Terms-of-trade deterioration has reduced real income
and consumption; the profit squeeze has reduced investmentdemand; the
fear of inflation and of ensuing current-account deficits hasalso imparted
a deflationary bias to aggregate demand management in virtually all
industrial countries. Finally, there is the reinforcing interaction of
contracting export markets. A large part of the 1970s slowdown in output
and productivity growth can be ascribed to the combined effect ofthese
demand-side factors. This is discussed inpart in the context of the
manufacturing sector (Section I) and more extensively in Section II, where
an international comparison of the aggregate business sector is studied.
A brief view of service industries is also given. It will beargued that
it is most probably the interaction of depressed demand (andgreater output
variability) with the supply shocks that provides the main explanation for
the aggregate productivity slowdown.
A major reason for the demand squeeze comes from the anti-inflation
bias of macro-economic policy in the major industrial countries.This is+ -4- +
brieflyconstrasted in Section III with the more expansionary policies
pursued by the middle-income developing countries, whose output and
productivity both continued to grow after 1973, but at the cost of higher
persistent inflation and large current-account deficits. While this option
can probably not be pursued by all countries simultaneously, it supports
the argument that productivity growth and macro-economicresponse are
closely linked.
I. INPUT SUBSTITUTION, DEMAND, AND THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
A convenient starting point for empirical study is protided bycomparative
developments in the manufacturing sector of the industrial countries. This
sector differs less from one country to another than the total business
economy and it is heavily dependent on purchased material inputs. Moreover,
there is sufficient cross-country variation in both the extent of the
slowdown in factor productivity and the magnitude of the input price shock
to allow a test of the possible relationship between the two.
The approach here is to extend the conventional two-factor production
framework by adding a third input, purchased materials or intermediate
goods, and proceed under the simplifying assumption that gross output in
manufacturing can be described in terms of a linearly homogeneous two-level
function Q =Q[V(K,L, T), N], where V is a real value added index,
K and L are capital and labour, N represents the composite material
input, and T represents pure technical progress. An earlier paper (Bruno,
1981) expounded the empirical conditions permitting such separability of
V andN. While this assumption may not be legitimate when considering
the energy input by itself, it- most probably is in the case ofnon-energy+ -5- +
inputs(see, e.g., Berndt and Wood, 1979).Given the smallness of the
direct energy input in the composite N for manufacturing (of the order
of 10 percent), such an approximation may be empirically valid.
Using lower-case letters for logarithms (q -logQ, etc.) and
dotted symbols for time derivatives, and denoting the output elasticity
of intermediate goods by and that of capital within V by we can
write
4 =(1- + = (1.- + + (1.-4)9]+ (1)
where A is the rate of technical progress in V.
Next we assume that the elasticity of substitution between V and N
is constant (denoted by ) from which it follows that
nq-air, (2)
where Tr is the (log) relative price of the intermediate input.
Substituting into (1) we get
4- [4&+ (l-4).] =A-a(1-8)1. (3)
The left-hand side of equation (3) represents the change in factor
productivity as measured in terms of gross ouput relative to the weighted
capital and labour input. The share of 4 will be constant if V(K, L)
is a Cobb-Douglas production function. On the right-hand side of (3)we
have a conventional time-shift factor (A) which is augmented or reduced
byamaterial-input price term according as relative raw-material prices+ -6- +
fallor rise over time. The coefficient of in (3) is the product
of the relative share of N and V in Q [/(l -)]and their
elasticity of substitution (a). If we had constant proportiOnS (a =0)
or no change in input prices(fr =0)this substitution term would be
immaterial and the measurement of factor productivity would be invariant
to the role of raw materials or to the choice of output measure (gross
output or some GDP artifact).
In my earlier paper a similar framework was applied to four large
industrial countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Japan) and direct estimates of the parameters (, , a, A) were obtained
from a two-equation system consisting of (3) and the associated factor-
price frontier. The model also allowed for some cyclical variation in
factor utilization. This and related studies (Bruno and Sachs, 1982,
Lipton, 1981) suggested an estimate of a of the order of 0.3-0.4 for
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, and 0.7-0.8 for Japan.
While the hypothesis gives a good explanation of the relative ranking of
the productivity slowdown for the four countries as well as a quantitative
fit for the lowest (Germany) and highest (Japan), there is a sizable
unexplained residual for the United Kingdom and a more moderate one for
the United States. It could also be argued that the implied estimate of
a for Japan is somewhat high. At any rate, there seems little doubt that
a fall in productivity is associated with a rise in raw-material prices.
The data also confirm such an effect for each of the two shocks (1973-74
and 1979-80) separately.
Table 1 gives the relevant average growth data for a wider sample of
ten OECD countries for the periods 1955-73 and 1974-80. Column (4) shows
the productivity slowdown measured under the assumption that 4 =0.35+ 7 +
Table1. Selected Data on Average Growth in Manufacturing and Aggregate
Demand, Ten OECD Countries: Change in Annual Percentage Rate of




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
United States-3.1 -2.2-0.9 -1.3 3.3 -0.7 -2.0
United Kingdom-5.1 -3.3-2.6 -2.0 6.4 -0.7 -2.1
Belgium -5.4 -4.5-1.4 -2.0 5.0 -1.6 -1.9
France -4.2 -3.6-0.1 -1.8 5.3 —0.7 -2.8
Germany -4.8-3.7-4.2 -0.9 1.9 -1.6 -2.2
Italy -3.7-1.0—1.8-2.4 11.0 -1.6-3.0
Netherlands -4.7 -3.6-1.4 -1.8 7.4 0.2 -2.7
Sweden -4.9 -1.0-2.4 -3.3 7.8 -1.2 -2.1
Canada -4.1 -1.8—0.8 -2.7 5.7 -3.6 -2.3
Japan -8.5 -6.0-3.7 -3.3 5.3 -1.5 -7.1
Mean -4.9 -3.1-1.9 -2.2 5.9 -1.3 -2.8
Change from 1955-72 to 1973-79
Source: Output and manhour data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor; Capital Stock data based on Artus (1977)
and updated; Materials input prices based on OECD and wholesale
price statistics of various countries. Public consumption from
OECD, National Income Accounts.+ -8- +
(obtainedfrom a cross-section regression). Inspection of the figures
for the drop in labour and capital inputs [columns (2) and (3)] reveals
that this measure is not very sensitive to the choice of 'f[achange of
in qchangesthe entries in column (4) by 0.06 on average]. There
is considerable variation in the estimated slowdown around the mean of
2.2 percent (from a base of 3.9 percent for 1955-73), the figures ranging
from less than 1 percent for Germany to more than 3 percent for Japan and
Sweden.
Neither oil nor raw material prices were constant during the high
growth period preceding 1972 (see Bosworth and Lawrence, 1982, for a
detailed study). Once the effects of the Korean boom had worked themselves
out, they declined steadily at a real annual rate of 0.5-1.0 percent from
1955 until 1971-72. The trend was reversed at the beginning of the 1970s,
culminating in the price explosion of 1973-74. Raw-material prices then
caine down again until a new shock hit both types of goods in 1979-80.
The magnitude of the total real input price shock (t*n)is here
measured by the differences in average growth from 1955-72 to 1973-79
[column (5); Table 1]. Much of the cross-country variation in
though by no means all of it, stems from differential movements of the
real effective exchange rate that mitigated or accentuated the effect of
the exogenous shock on domestic relative prices. It is important to
stress again that even the external part of the real price increases is
only in part directly due to energy prices, although extraction costs, etc.,
may have been indirectly affected by the energy crisis. (For more details
on the large increase in primary non-fuel export prices see Kravis and
Lipsey, 1981.)
A first shot at assessing the possible association between raw-material+ -9- +
prices and factor productivity growth is obtained bytaking observations
on average growth in each of the two sub-periods, 1955-73 and1974-80, for
the ten countries listed in Table 1, a total of 20observations (not
detailed here), and pretending that theycome from a common underlying
production model. Obviously, such an approach ignores thepossible
intercountry differences in basic productivity growth,quite apart from
possible differences in other parameters.
It is interesting to note that even thissimple regression (Table 2,
line 1) yields a significant and quiteplausible estimate for the input-
price term (-0.25). As long as basiccountry differences in production
parameters are not correlated with the differences in raw-materialprice
changes this might give an unbiased estimate of the term in
equation (3). However, while it can be argued that the shares
jand
,andpossibly the elasticity of substitution (cl), are similar in
different countries, factor productivity (X) almostcertainly varies.
Moreover, the higher the basic factor productivity growth, themore
likely it is that real exchange-rate appreciation would behigher (or
depreciation lower) and ceteris paribus, would thus be lower. This
would introduce an upward bias in the estimated effect of Some
evidence of this can be obtained when one introduces thegrowth of public
consumption expenditure () into the regression. Since it is correlated
with real appreciation, its coefficient is overstatedin the regression
and that ofris substantially reduced. n
One way of overcoming this statisticaiproblem,at the cost of a
severe cut in degrees of freedom, is by going to the firstdifferences of
average growth rates.If it is assumed that countriesmay differ in basic
productivity attributes but that in themselves these attributesare time+ -10- +
Table2.Selected Regressions of Average Factor Productivity Growth in
Manufacturing: Ten OECD Countries,I1955-73 andII1974-80













Excluding Japan. Number of observations 9.
£1Regressionforced through the origin.


















































invariant,the problem is side-stepped. The resulting regression
(Table 2, line 3) shows two things. With a value of of about 0.35
the coefficient of -0.17 suggests an average elasticity of substitution
of 0.32. At the same time the significant negative intercept (-1.18)
suggests a common element of the slowdown which is not captured by the
raw-material factor. It is interesting to note that the exclusion of
Japan, an outlier, from this regression only raises the frft coefficient
to 0.18, but the standard error falls (from 0.094 to 0.076), and R2
rises considerably (from 0.19 to 0.37).
Regressions 5 and 6 add the deceleration in public expenditure and
total domestic absorption, respectively [see columns (6) and (7) of
Table 1]. These variables seem to improve the explanatory power
considerably, make the intercept nonsignificant, and hardly change the
estimate of thu. For a regression on 10 observations this is a
satisfactory result. It is important to stress that the deceleration in
total absorption (M) is virtually uncorrelated with the acceleration
in raw-material prices (the correlation coefficient between 1A and
is -0.06) so that Eâ may be considered a truly independent factor. For
a subsector such as manufacturing it can probably also be considered
exogenous.
On the assumption that these two variables exhaust the productivity
slowdown we obtain the next regression (Table 2, line 7), which is forced
through the origin. This raises the estimate of a to 0.39 and is the
preferred regression. Table 3 shows the estimated components of the
slowdown and the errors of the regression by country. It is interesting
that with this simple model the four large countries previously mentioned
all come out virtually on the regression line (errors ranging between 0+ -12- +


















United States -1.34 -0.69 -0.61 -0.04
United Kingdom -2.05 -1.34 -0.66 -0.05
Belgium -1.96 -1.05 -0.58 -0.33
France -1.84 -1.11 —0.87 0.14
Germany -0.95 -0.40 -0.66 0.11
Italy -2.37 -2.31 -0.92 0.86
Netherlands -1.79 -1.55 -0.83 0.59
Sweden -3.38 -1.64 -0.65 -1.09
Canada -2.66 -1.20 -0.71 -0.75
Japan -3.30 -1.11 -2.19 0.00
Mean -2.16 -1.24 -0.87 (-0.05)
Based on regression 6, Table 2.+ —13— +
and0.1). On average raw materials explain about 60 percent of the
slowdown, with the demand squeeze explaining the remaining 40 percent.
Two outliers for which the regression under-explains are Sweden and
Canada and one extreme over-explained case is Italy.
A glance at column (7) of Table 1 shows that Japan had by far the
largest demand squeeze. With such a small sample there is a danger of
accidentally attributing significance to a variable which only comes in
as a result of one extreme observation. Indeed, when regression 7 is run
without Japan the coefficient of is rendered nonsignificant, though
it retains the same estimated value. However, the alternative regression
8, using public consumption (ti) as a proxy for demand management, is
highly significant and the estimated effect of raw-material prices is even
higher in this case (possibly reflecting an indirect income effect--the
share of this component in the slowdown rises to 75 percent). The earlier
reservation concerning correlation between and does not apply in
this case as the correlation coefficient for the increments 4 and t*
is virtually nil (0.055). For this regression Canada is no longer an
outlier but the error for Sweden remains high. Another demand factor,
exports, was also tried, but although it helps, the marginal improvement
in the estimate does not justify its separate mention here. Also, its
exogeneity with respect to productivity growth is probably more suspect.
The relationship between demand and productivity is discussed in greater
detail in the next section.
At this stage we come to another important concomitant of the shock
of the l970s. Not only has the average growth level changed but so has
its variability. Looking at the variance of output growth in manufacturing
during sub-periods from 1955 to 1980 it can be shown that except in two+ -14- +
countries,Denmark and Japan, the variance (or standard deviation)
increased after 1973 even though output growth dropped substantially.
The coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the standard deviation
to the mean [shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4] has on average grown
by a factor of five. While this ratio is, of course, largely affected by
what has happened to its denominator (mean growth rate), it is nonetheless
indicative of the unprecedented change that has taken place in the economic
environment. At a time of severe fluctuations in output the average
optimal use of inputs per unit of output is necessarily greater than in a
situation of greater certainty. Average factor productivity must thus
fall. Geometrically this can be illustrated by comparing the mean cost
of two points on opposite branches of a U-shaped cost curve with the point
of minimum-cost production (assuming this is the equivalent output level
under certainty). Under uncertainty producers may opt for flatter cost
curves but at the price of a higher minimum cost. Some such argument may
account for an outlier like Sweden where the increase in relative
variability of output growth was particularly large (mean output actually
dropped in the late 197 Os). It is also known that in this country
reallocation of factors was hampered by government subsidies to ailing
industries.
A more dieaggregated view
Our view of manufacturing output as the outcome of an aggregate production
process is clearly an abstraction. The estimated effect of material
inputs still leaves open the question as to whether it is the outcome of
analogous substitution processes within subsectors or the result of a
change in the composition of demand in response to relative price changes.+ -15-
Table 4.Variance of Output Growth in Manufacturing andTotalGDP:
Coefficient of Output Variation
Manufacturing GDP
1955-73 1974-80 1960-73 1974-79
United States 1.3 4.7 0.5 0.9
United Kingdom 1.0 2.2 0.4 1.7
Belgium 0.4 3.2 0.2 1.2
France 0.3 1.2 0.1 0.6
Germany 0.7 2.1 0.5 0.9
Italy 0.5 1.7 0.7 1.5
Netherlands 0.5 2.4
Sweden 0.4 13.4 0.4 1.3
Canada 0.6 2.4 0.3 0.7
Japan 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.1
Mean 0.6 3.4 0.4 1.0
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, and OECD,
National Income Accounte.+ -16- +
Themore disaggregated a view we take, the more likely it is that the
latter will dominate. A partial look inside the 'black box' is provided
by considering an intermediate division of the sector into major 2-digit
industries. The results of such an experiment for U.K. manufacturing are
reported in Table 5 and are based on an ongoing study by Louis Dicks-
Mireaux. Input prices were measured for each of the major industries
(from an input-output breakdown). Factor productivity growth, as defined
in equation (3), using separate shares () for each industry [see
column (1), Table 5], was regressed on share-weighted lagged input price
change as well as on the growth of total GDP (a proxy for aggregate demand
pressure).
Column (2) of the table gives the measured share of materials and
intermediate inputs by industry. It here includes not only purchased
inputs from outside manufacturing (as was the case in the earlier aggregate
regressions) but also inputs that are internal to the broader manufacturing
sector (30 percent on average). The figures in italics indicate the
imported part of the material input. Columns (3), (4) and (5) give the
estimated coefficients (and standard errors) of the total productivity
shift, A, the elasticity of substitution, ,andthe elasticity of
GDP growth, ';ofthe two regressions in each industry, (a) excludes and
(b) includes 1r
The regressions by and large confirm the results for the aggregate
sector. For 10 out of 14 industries the substitution term [column (4)]
is negative and in most cases highly significant. In only one industry
(order 8, instrument engineering) is the coefficient significantly positive
and in the remaining three (orders 7, 12, 14-15) it is zero or positive
but not significant. It should be noted that in these four industries the+ -17- +
shareof the import component is very low (10 percent or less). Except
for food (order 3) the estimated elasticity of substitution ranges from
0.25 to 0.56--the average for the ten industries is 0.39 in the (a)
regressions and 0.27 in the (b) regressions. Inclusion of total GDP
growth takes away some of the indirect effect of raw-material prices, as
we saw in the aggregate regression. At this level of disaggregation the
substitution effect, or whatever phenomenon this variable measures, is
obviously significant in explaining productivity slowdown by industry.
Similar results have also been obtained in an ongoing study based on
Israeli data by M. Bar-Nathan of the Bank of Israel. He obtains
significant negative coefficients for in 10 out of 17 major industries
with all other industries showing nonsignificant coefficients. The
estimated average a of 0.6 is somewhat higher than in the United Kingdom,
but his regressions did not include aggregate GDP, only average hours
worked (as a proxy for demand).
We conclude this section with a comment on the input substitution
hypothesis and the relevance of alternative theories. In this study we
have treated gross capital stock as a homogeneous input over time. It
may be argued that one result of a rise in energy prices may be that
pre-1973 capital becomes obsolete. In this case our measure of average
factor productivity would be biased. A useful alternative approach
(recently started by Baily, 1981) would be to measure the change in capital
stock and productivity in a way that takes this factor explicitly into
account.
Which of these alternative views of the role of energy and materials
in production turns out to be empirically more fruitful must await further
study. Both, however, share the position that the productivity slowdown+ -18- +
Table5. Factor Productivity Regreasione for 14 U.K. Manufacturing































































































































11 Vehicles+ -19- +
Table5 (contd). Factor Productivity Regre8sion8 for 14 U.K. Manufacturing
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14-Leather and 19650.16 0.58a 2.260.06 -0.061.35








16Construction 19710.22 0.54a 2.62-0.56 0.241.10








17Timber and19570.22 0.52a 1.83-0.47 0.262.13
























Small numerals are standard errors. Figures in italics in column (2)
represent shares of imported inputs.
The numbering of sectors corresponds to SIC orders. Orders 10 (ship-
building) and 19 (miscellaneous) were omitted, l' and 15 combined.
Source: Based on detailed data compiled by Louis Dicks-Mireaux from
miscellaneous CSO publications.+ -20- +
inmanufacturing must somehow be related to the input price shocks of
the 1970s.
II. PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISONS FOR THE AGGREGATE BUSINESS SECTOR
Wenowturn to a more aggregative view of the total business sector.
While manufacturing and its subsectors are heavy users of raw materials,
the same cannot be said of most of the nonmanufacturing sectors and yet
the productivity slowdown in the economy as a whole seems, if anything,
to have been more marked than in manufacturing. To what extent can any
of the arguments advanced above also be applied to the broader economy?
If we consider the economy as an aggregate productive framework, this
time employing labour and capital in conjunction with total imports, there
would be some analogy with our previous discussion. An increase in
relative import prices would cause substitution against imports, and
aggregate gross output (measured in some suitable form, per unit of the
two other factors) would grow more slowly. There are some important
differences here, however. First of all, unlike in the case of
manufacturing, there is no need to resort to a gross output measure (the
analogue would presumably be total real use of resources). Both the
quantity and the price of total imports are directly measurable so that
one could, at least in principle, attempt to construct a real GDP index
which is free of import price bias, and relate it to the inputs of labour
and capital. Any remaining effect of an increase in real import prices
on an unbiased factor-productivity measure could then only be the result
of misallocation of factors caused by the real shock or its interaction
with depressed aggregate demand or the increase in output variability,
arguments that would apply equally well outside the manufacturing sector.+ -21- +
However,this would not, strictly speaking, be the same as the input-
substitution argument (part of the fall in demand is itself a reflection
of a terms-of-trade effect on real income- -see below).
In trying to search for a test of these ideas our point of departure
is a recent study by Kendrick (1981). In this study the productivity
slowdown from 1960-73 to 1974-79 in nine OECD countries (the ten used here
excluding the Netherlands) is analysed in terms of the aggregate GDP of
the business sector and its average factor (labour and capital) use. With
minor modifications, columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 replicate Kendrickts
data. Column (4) shows an average factor-productivity slowdown which, on
the face of it, looks more marked than in manufacturing [cf. column (4)
of Table 1], and is particularly high for Italy and Japan (the figures are
otherwise quite similar). Kendrick applied a Denison-type growth-accounting
approach to the component analysis of this change. Other than the
conventional changes in labour quality and technical knowledge, the main
factors that accowit for the slowdown (Kendrick, 1981, p. 141, Table 7)
are reallocation of labour, economies of scale, capacity utilization, and
government regulations. Together these items account, in his analysis,
for 1.5 points out of an average 2.4 percent slowdown in factor
productivity.
While the problem of oil and raw-material prices is mentioned in
Kendrick's discussion, no attempt is made to measure its contribution.
Government regulations is the only item that could be associated with an
increase in the cost of materials but it only amounts to 0.4 points of
the 1.5 mentioned. The other three factors could be associated with the
demand squeeze argument (or the interaction between the demand squeeze
and the real shock).+ -22- +
Table6.Selected Data on Average Growth in the BUSine8B Sector, Nine



























UnitedStates -1.5 0.5 -1.4 -1.3 0.4 8.2 0.09
UnitedKingdom-2.4-0.5 -0.5 -1.9 0.8 5.5 0.28
Belgium -3.2-1.5 -1.7 -1.6 0.6 -3.3 0.58
France -2.6-0.9 -0.8 -1.7 0.4 0.1 0.18
Germany -2.4-0.9 -2.0 -1.1 0.1 -2.1 0.10
Italy -3.0 3.2-0. -4.8 0.0 14.1 0.23
Sweden -4.1-0.8 -0.7 -3.3 0.2 4.2 0.29
Canada -2.6 0.6 0.1 -3.0 0.9 4.0 0.26
Japan -6.6-0.5 -4.5 -4.7 0.9 6.6 0.12
Mean -3.2-0.1 -1.4 -2.6 0.5 4.1 0.24
Kendrick's (1981) estimates, based on OECD data at 1975 prices.
The share of capital weighted at 0.35.
The difference in incremental growth between GDP measured on a Divisia
index basis and GDP at 1975 prices.
The change in growth rates of import prices relative to GDP.
Average ratio of imports to GDP during 1974-79.+ -23- +
Intrying to apply our framework to the data the first point to be
made relates to the problem of GDP measurement. The OECD data on which
Kendrick's analysis is based measure GDP at constant 1975 prices, using
a conventional double deflation procedure.I have shown elsewhere (Bruno,
1981) that double deflation may cause a systematic bias when import prices
change monotonically in either direction. Specifically, in this case, one
would expect to get an upward bias in the GDP growth measure relative to
a Divisia index for the earlier years in which there was a consistent fall
in relative import/GDP prices. For the period 1974-79, using an intra-
period (1975) base could work either way.
GDP was re-estimated using a moving weight Divisia index. There was
an average upward bias of 0.31 percent for 1960-73 and an average downward
bias in GDP growth of 0.16 percent for 1973-79. The total bias over the
two periods thus amounts to 0.47 percent, which is quite sizable, relative
to the average deceleration in factor productivity.For some countries
(e.g., the United Kingdom) the relative importance of the bias is even
greater [see column (5), Table 6]. Part of the deceleration then, is
nothing but a statistical artifact directly associated with a shift from
a period of falling relative import prices to a period of rising ones I
[This problem was mentioned in an OECD document (1980) but not really
followed through to its logical conclusion. Note that moving from a 1970
to a 1975 base does not resolve it.]
Once we correct for the measurement bias we can proceed to look at
the relationship between the modified factor-productivity figures and the
relevant supply and demand variables. The first regression in Table 7
relates 18 average growth-rate observations (nine countries for two
periods) to the share-weighted rate of change of import prices relative+ -24- +
Table7. Selected Regressions of Productivity Growth' in the BuaineSB
Sector: Nine OECD Countries, I 1960-73 and II 1974-79





































Average productivity growth corrected for measurement bias.
Estimated by two-stage least squares with and ( - as
instruments.






























tothe Divisia index of GDP prices (consistent with the quantity measure
employed above). [Only the acceleration (or deceleration) of import prices
is given in column (6) of Table 6; column (7) shows the average relative
M/V share for the second period.] Adding a demand variable (or
as is done in regressions 2 and 3, does not remove the effect of import
prices even though the underlying GDP quantity measure should, in principle,
be free of the direct effect of relative import prices. Moreover, whatever
effect import prices had on real income should have been neutralized by the
inclusion of the domestic absorption variable (atwo-stageprocedure was
employed in regressions 3 and 4). The alternative view that it is only the
the interaction of import prices and demand that matters is represented
by regression 4, for which the fit is slightly better (including m -
separatelyin this regression adds nothing).
Recalling the argument about the possible endogeneity and reverse
causality of the relative-price term these regressions were also run using
the relative import/U.S. export price (- f), whichis free of real
exchange-rate effects, and obtained similar, though less significant
results (there is less intercountry variation in this index). It might
also be objected that the sample is too small. Unfortunately, no capital-
stock data are available for other OECD countries. However, little is
lost by regressing labour productivity rather than factor productivityon
these variables. When we extend the sample to include 19 OECD countries,
the 38-observation regression of r- 9gives (with y denoting weights):
- - :fl ( = 0.20)
Using ainsteadof in this regression gives an elasticity of
1.00 (±0.14) with f2= 0.63,but the coefficient of (- *)ybecomes+ -26-- +
positive and nonsignificant. Since aishighly negatively correlated
(-0.645) with the price factor (which is not) this may be a reflection
of the fact that all of the terms-of-trade effect is already captured by
the absorption variable, while represents a more independent demand
pull variable.
Regressions 5 to 9 present results, using the samepricevariable,
in terms of incremental growth, for which internal correlation between the
explanatory variables is much smaller. The last three regressions again
force a zero constant (in regression 2 it is not significant once ais
introduced). An analogous regression with (- gives very similar
results, again less significant.
Table 8 presents the breakdown by components and the residuals for
regression 7. The net role of import prices is here much smaller than for
the manufacturing sector by itself, with the demand factor taking a much
larger share. Similar results are obtained for the alternative regression
8. Sweden is an outlier and so are Belgium and Italy. The large increase
in output variability shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 may be part
of the explanation for Belgium and Sweden (in both countries realwages
were also quite rigid).
This discussion shows that the basic argument about the role of the
supply shock and the demand response also applies with some modification
to the aggregate private sector. By implication one would expect to find
that in non-manufacturing, less material-intensive, sectors (such as
services) it is mainly the demand squeeze that accounts for the slowdown.
Some evidence is provided by looking at such partial data as there are for
the service sector in these economies. The growth of GDP per employed
person -) inthe nine OECD countries and the two periods (data+ -27- +
Table8.Components of Productivity Slowdowninthe Buai-nesa Sector:
1960—73 to 1974—79




UnitedStates -0.9 -0.4 -1.0 0.5
UnitedKingdom -1.1 -0.8 -1.3 1.0
Belgium
0 -1.0 1.2 -1.2 -1.0
France -1.4 0.1 -1.7 0.2
Germany -1.0 0.2 -1.3 0.1
Italy -4.8 -1.6 -2.2 -1.0
Sweden -3.2 -0.5 -1.3 -1.4
Canada -2.1 -0.5 -1.3 -0.3
Japan -3.8 -0.3 -4.3 0.8




Corrected for measurement bias [see Table 6 column (4)].+ -28.- +
fromOECD, 1980) was regressed on total domestic absorption ()andthe
relative price of imports, using public consumption growth and the terms
of trade (- asinstruments. This gives
-= -0.75+O.Ol(—)+0.79k (2=0.70). Ss 0,590.3k m V 0.15
Thedisappearance of the import price variable from this regression
(it does appear highly significant in a regression in which replaces
suggests very clearly that here it is only demand that matters
directly. The latter is in turn affected by government fiscal policy as
well as by the terms of trade (the elasticity withrespect to each is
about 1).
We now have further evidence to support the claim that the intensity
of material-input use in a sector must have had something to do with the
effect of the rise in material-input prices on productivity. Manufacturing
industries were heavily affected, services apparently not. We can nowgo
back to the earlier part of the discussion and ask--when oneaggregates
across sectors, some of which were directlyhit by input prices and some
of which were not, how would one expect theaggregate economy to behave?
On the face of it, we have corrected for the import price bias, andany
internal relative price changes should wash out in aggregate GDP as well
as in the factor input and productivity measures, provided there is full
factor mobility between sectors. If, however, these assumptions do not
hold, e.g., if factors do not reallocate freely, then a shock toany one
sector may also show in the aggregate. This argument can be made more
precise.
Suppose the economy consists of several sectors producing a total
GNP, V, which is broken down into V0 =V0(K0,L0), a reference sector+ -29- +
in which no disturbance occurs, and V =V(K,L., T.) (i =1,2,...,n)
representing the other sectors. K and L are the respective factor
inputs, and T are exogenous shift terms (technology, material input
prices, etc.). Denoting relative output prices (in terms of V0 as
nuineraire) by P, we have
V =V(K ,L)+EP.V.(K., L., 1.) . (4) 0 0 0 11 1 1 1
For changes we get
LW =(V0/9K0)iK0+ EP(9V./K.)LK.




DenoteZ K1 =K, =L,3V0/K0 =R,V0/L0 =W,and
1=0 1=0







The left-hand side of equation (6) represents aggregate factor
productivity as conventionally measured. The right-hand side consists
of three terms. The first is the sum of the sectoral shift factors; the
other two are terms involving divergences of marginal factor productivities
from real factor returns multiplied by the rates of change of factors by
sector.
Suppose there is a negative disturbance (<0) in any one sector
which is not matched by a positive disturbance in another. There are two+ -30- +
waysin which this will not fully translate to the left-hand side of (6).
Either V and aggregate V may be measured with T properly netted
out; or factors always reallocate in the 'right' direction, i.e., 0
whenever PV./3K.R (and similarly for 2). The whole rationale of
aggregate productivity measurement rests on the assumption that in the long
run and on average marginal products of factors equalize across sectors,
so that the last two terms in equation (6) disappear while V, K, and L
are measured so that the only T. disturbances that can appear are of a
pure technology kind. In the situation that prevailed in the 1970s, with
real shocks, depressed demand, and increased uncertainty, probably none of
these conditions held. Because of capital immobility and sluggish labour
adjustment there are built-in asymmetries between expanding and contracting
sectors which may impart a negative bias to the two divergence terms in
(6) (that is, <Rmay more often go together with ? 0,
and similarly for labour).It is also very likely that the overall
correction introduced to take account of rising import prices does not
properly capture the effect of individual sector input price shifts.
(Regression of the measurement bias on m gives nonsignificant
results.) It is perhaps no accident that when we multiply the estimated
input price effect in manufacturing [column (2), Table 3] by the average
share of the sector in the business economy (1/3, say) we get figures that
are for several of the countries quite close to the estimated role of
import prices in the aggregate business sector [column (2), Table 8]. It
is as if a ceteria paribuB assumption applied in equation (5) or (6) and
1W =V1
= where i would stand for the manufacturing
sector. But this may, of course, be stretching the argument too far.
Finally we may note that while the intercountry variance of labour-+ -31- +
productivitygrowth stayed as high in the second as in the first period
in manufacturing (1.79 compared with 1.77) in the service sector it fell
(from 1.36 to 1.11). For the business sector the intercountry variance
fell even more (from 1.97 to 1.34). This too may be evidence that
manufacturing was hit more directly by the real supply shocks which
worked differentially in the industrial countries. The absolute demand
squeeze, with one or two exceptions, was more uniform across countries.
III.CONCLUDING REMARKS
Canone try to attach a consistent story to these international
comparisons of productivity slowdown? While for some countries there may
already have been signs of deceleration in productivity growth by the end
of the l960s (a point made for the United States by Denison, 1979,
Nordhaus, 1982, and others), it seems that the dominant role was played
by the commodity-price shock of the early 1970s. Until then raw-material
and energy prices were falling in real terms. There was a turning point
in 1971-72, the price rise culminating in the great shock of 1973-74. In
spite of subsequent fluctuations the earlier low levels were never
recovered even for raw materials (at least not by the end of 1981). This
price shock affected the material (and energy) input intensive sectors
directly. As we have seen, more than half of the slowdown in manufacturing
can be ascribed to this direct effect. Two secondary effects played a
role on the demand side. The terms-of-trade effect on the income of net
importers, the investment squeeze, and the induced contractionary fiscal
(and monetary) measures have generally kept economic activity growing
much more slowly since 1973. The major industrial countries, in particular
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, adopted contractionary+ -32- +
policiesfor fear of excessive inflation and current-account deficits.
The depressed domestic demand (which, in turn, interacts with export
demand) has impeded the internal relative price and factor adjustment
process necessitated by these supply shocks. When seen in this light,
the observed productivity slowdown is thus directly linked to the choice
of short-term and medium-term macro-economic response strategy.
In this context one may refer to another structural factor that is
sometimesproposed as a possible culprit--the import and export competition
from the newly industrialized countries (NICs). The rapid development of
the NICs is not a new phenomenon of the 1970s--it started in the 1960s
and even before that- -yet it was not a special issue during the rapid
growth phase. Why would it cause more problems in the 1970s? The answer,
which is related to our earlier discussion, seems to be that in a rapidly
growing economy it is much easier to adjust to external competitive shocks
because there is excess demand and factors will easily move into more
productive activities with less risk of unemployment. At a time of general
slack, on the other hand, the system tends to freeze into old modes of
operation and fear of unemployment causes retrenchment, excessive
subsidization of ailing industries, and the like. This links up with our
present topic only in the sense that it would probably be wrong to ascribe
a separate role to external competition as an explanatory factor in the
productivity story. Rather, it is the generally depressed internal
economic conditions that tend to impede adjustment to both types of
external shock and thus show up in the form of reduced productivity growth.
The NICs and the much broader group of middle-income developing
countries (MICs) can be brought into the story to play another role. They
provide an exception to the characterization of OECD response which may+ -33- +
atthe same time strengthen the argument. Faced with the same exogenous
input price shocks these economies, and in particular their manufacturing
sectors, performed quite well in the 1970s in terms of output and general
economic activity, while most OECD countries did miserably in this respect.
Part of the answer, which is not directly relevant here, has to do with
the emergence of an international private capital market to which many of
the NICs had access and for a time could borrow heavily at zero or negative
real interest rates (I discuss this in another paper, 1982). The other
side, more relevant to our present discussion, is that these countries have
by and large been pursuing highly expansionary domestic policies. As the
recent World Development Report (1981; p. 140, Table 4) shows, domestic
absorption in the group of 60 middle-income countries grew at least as
fast in the 1970s as in the previous decade. The cost of choosing the
expansionary option was much higher inflation and larger current-account
deficits (which were themselves required to effect the resource transfer
from OPEC). But it showed up in continued rapid growth in both output and
labourproductivity. (There are unfortunately no data on total factor
productivity.)The data show a more expansionary response of the MICs
after 1973, yet a close association between output and labour productivity
in all countries. There is little doubt that the more expansionary internal
policies (and smaller output variability) of the MICs have a lot do so
with the difference in economic performance. Paradoxically, it is likely
that the relative success of the MICs would not have been possible if the
OECD countries had also followed a more expansionary policy, since
competition for the OPEC surplus would have made this a much more costly
option to pursue (by 1980-81 real interest rates had indeed risen). But
for the present purpose this example illustrates that productivity and+ 34 +
macro-economicresponse are closely linked.
Finally, if the view of the sources of the productivity slowdown in
the OECD countries advocated here is correct, it also follows that this
phenomenon is only as transitory or as permanent as the macro-economic
climate of the world economy. If input price shocks continue to hit the
world economy frequently, but at uncertain intervals, and if cost-induced
inflationary waves are going to be followed by contractionary demand
policies in the leading industrial countries, then there is no reason to
consider the slowdown as transitory. If, on the other hand, the system
were to find an efficient way of smoothing the fluctuations in real input
prices (e.g., bycoinmodity agreements, buffer stocks, or the break-up of
cartels) and of better co.-ordinating economic activity and monetary
policies across national frontiers, then one of the major sources of the
slowdown will be removed. The best bet probably lies with neither of the
two extremes. There may be some learning and adaptation to the new
environment which would allow pursuit of reasonable inflation rates without
the enormous cost in unemployment that has been paid in recent years. The
upshot of the present discussion is that in this case aggregate productivity
growth in the industrial countries might improve along with the hoped-for
improvement in overall macro-economic performance.+ -35_ +
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